Eighteenth century Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz once cautioned that, “No one starts a war — or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so — without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it,” illustrating that should war become inevitable, there must be sufficient reasoning and objectives established to bring about some kind of outcome.
In On War, Clausewitz writes on the difference between political objectives and military objectives, emphasizing that military objectives are informed by a corresponding set of political outcomes.
In World War II, the unconditional surrender of Nazi Germany caused Allied planners to create military objectives that ended in the capture of Berlin. The means were enormous and incredibly costly, yet these military objectives clearly translated into the sought political ends.
In the currently suspended U.S.-Iran conflict, President Trump has been heavily criticized for not revealing clear or realistic political objectives to end U.S. activity in the region.
On April 1, 32 days since the start of the air campaign, President Trump addressed the nation, affirming a myriad of objectives that have been incremented since the first bombs fell: “obliterate Iran’s ballistic missile arsenal and production capability, annihilate its navy, sever its support for terrorist proxies, and ensure the world’s leading state sponsor of terrorism never acquires a nuclear weapon.”
While this string of objectives is the most commonly presented end goal, commentary has been mixed, especially regarding the touchy subject of regime change with administration officials.
While officials have walked back claims of an overt regime change operation, actions do speak louder than words, as the decapitation strike that killed former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in the opening maneuvers most certainly was intended to change the regime in some capacity.
Remarks from President Trump on April 6 have continued to obfuscate his stated objectives, with the president acknowledging his business-oriented priorities, such as gaining access to Iranian oil or charging tolls for maritime traffic transiting the Strait of Hormuz.
Demilitarization, deradicalization, denuclearization, possible regime change, oil access and possible maritime extortion create quite a long list of possible political objectives. Each of these objectives are theoretically achievable through military means, but recall Clausewitz’s warning of aligning military objectives with political goals.
An air war is simply not sustainable and likely cannot provide any meaningful long-term results in accomplishing the proposed task list. Precision munitions can obliterate missile factories and demolish nuclear enrichment facilities, torpedoes can sink a navy and dismantled chains of command can cause serious disruptions in Iranian proxy networks — but the best aircraft in the world can only do so much.
Factories and navies can be rebuilt, new leaders can reform disorganized proxy cells and historical evidence of strategic bombing campaigns has shown these operations alone rarely translate into the submission of a regime; they in fact bolster them, creating a new series of geopolitical crises the next generation of Americans will have to inherit.
Iran understands that it cannot match American-Israeli air dominance or conventional military capabilities. These threats forced Iranian strategists to craft its warfighting doctrine of “Mosaic defense” to become decentralized and asymmetric — countering superior firepower with operational endurance.
The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, abbreviated as the IRGC, has trained many of its militia proxies like Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis in how to conduct warfare and produce weaponry even at severe disadvantages, as observed to this day in Gaza, Lebanon and Yemen. To assume Iran lacks this capability on their home turf would be a dangerous miscalculation.
This is perhaps why a peace deal has failed to materialize over the nearly month long ceasefire agreed upon in early April. Even if Iran’s air, air defense, and strike capabilities have been severely degraded, Tehran maintains plenty of negotiating leverage to counter Trump’s roster of war aims. With its fears about the consequences of lacking nuclear weapons seemingly confirmed, Iran has exhibited little incentive to surrender under present conditions.
With no way for the U.S. to physically restrain weapon production, nuclear or otherwise, Iran has opted into one of two strategies: wait for Washington to back off from its expensive air-sea campaign or invite American ground forces into an arduous invasion. After all, the remainder of the Nazi regime did not capitulate until the Soviets raised their flag over the Reichstag.
In order for President Trump to accomplish his host of shuffling political objectives, serious consideration will need to be given in designing complementary military plans. Deployments of ground troops suggest that Washington has finally recognized this, perhaps the only method in securing critical ground lines of communication and administrative infrastructure to capitulate Iranian resistance.
For Trump, both edges of the sword are sharp: concede to a regime he emboldened, or undertake a costly ground campaign for an already unpopular war.
Thomas Bergeron is a 26-year-old graduate student from Baton Rouge.
